Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 18
Issue 2 Spring 2011

Article 6

2011

In Closing the Door to Environmental Public Nuisance Claims, did
the Fourth Circuit Leave a Window Cracked? North Carolina ex rel.
Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority
Katherine E. Vogt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Katherine E. Vogt, In Closing the Door to Environmental Public Nuisance Claims, did the Fourth Circuit
Leave a Window Cracked? North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 18 Mo. Envtl. L. &
Pol'y Rev. 332 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol18/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

In Closing the Door to Environmental Public Nuisance Claims, Did
the Fourth Circuit Leave a Window Cracked?
North Carolinaex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority

I.

INTRODUCTION

Global warming. Climate change. Regardless of the vernacular
used, it is a scientific fact that the Earth is experiencing unpredicted
temperature changes, and it seems logically implausible that humans have
had nothing to do with it. 2 In the face of this knowledge,
environmentalists scream for a change in how the world conducts itself.
To effect this change, many believe the United States must set the
example for the rest of the world with self-regulation. However, the tugof-war between changing political administrations and the need for
proactive measures to deal with climate change has not yet produced
desired results. Frustrated with the legislative process and its many
loopholes, activists have turned to the judicial branch to force the issue.
This note will analyze how the common law.tort of public nuisance is
faring as a tool for environmental litigation. Furthermore, in discussing
the recent decision of North Carolinaex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley
Authority,3 it is important to determine whether the court closed the door
for public nuisance claims, yet possibly opened a window.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") is a federal agency
established in 1933 with a primary objective of producing, distributing and
selling electric power.4 TVA provides electricity to parts of seven states, 5
' 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
2 DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK
§ 10:1 (20th ed.
2010) (emphasizing how climate scientists have overwhelmingly concluded that
manmade emissions are contributing to global warming).
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (CooperII), 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir.
2010).
4 CooperII, 615 F.3d at 296 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 831d(l), 831i, 831n-4(f) (2006)).
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and much of this power is generated by coal-fired power plants located in
Tennessee, Alabama and Kentucky. 6 Coal-fired power plants emit sulfur
dioxide ("SO2 ") and nitrous oxides ("NOx"), which can transform into
"fine particulate matter" ("PM 2 .5")-all of which are extensively regulated
through the federal Clean Air Act.7
In order to control these emissions, TVA power plants have
numerous pollution controls; including the use of SO2 scrubbers,8 selective
catalytic reduction (lants ("SCR"), 9 selective non-catalytic reduction
controls ("SNGR"),' and low-output NO,, coal." TVA has promulgated
these controls in accordance with the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") regulations, the Clean Air Act and the individual state standards
that control each plant. 12
While the Clean Air Act and the EPA are the primary means of
managing emissions and developing standards, specific decisions
regarding how to meet these standards are left up to the individual states. 13
Some 'states choose to view the EPA's standards as a minimum
requirement and enact statutes subjecting emitters to a stricter standard.
North Carolina is one such state, implementing the North Carolina Clean
Smokestacks Act 1 4 to provide more stringent controls for in-state coalfired plants than the Clean Air Act requires.'
power service area covers approximately 80,000 square miles including most of
Tennessee and parts of Mississippi, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, and North
Carolina. FrequentlyAsked Questions about TVA, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
http://www.tva.gov/abouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
6 Cooper II,
615 F.3d at 296.
7
Id. The Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7681q (2006).
8 Cooper II, 615 F.3d at 296-97. Scrubbers are large chemical plants that can remove
SO2 from exhaust emitted from a power plant. Id at 297. This "flue gas desulfurization
system" can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Id.at 296-97.
9
Id. at 297. SCRs are also large buildings costing hundreds of millions of dollars to
construct but can remove approximately 90% of the NOx emissions from a coal power
Id.
Plant.
oId. Costing less than an SCR but not nearly as effective, a SNGR can remove 20-40%
of NO. from power plant emissions. Id.
5 TVA's

11

Id.

1d. at 296.
13Id. at 299 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2008)).
14 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.105 to .114C (2010).
15 Cooper II,
615 F.3d at 297 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107D(b)-(e)).
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Based on this stricter standard, Plaintiff-Appellant, the state of
North Carolina, filed the initial action against TVA on behalf of its
citizens, alleging TVA's eleven coal-fired power plants' 6 constitute a
public nuisance and subsequently sought an injunction against the TVA
plants. Due to the weather systems in states where TVA plants operate,
some emissions from these plants move eastward into North Carolina and
other neighboring states.' 8 North Carolina contended these emissions
from TVA plants enter the state in "unreasonable amounts, thereby
threatening the health of millions of people, the financial viability of an
entire region and the beauty and purity of a vast natural ecosystem." 9
TVA initially moved to dismiss this suit, arguing that the
discretionary function doctrine20 and the Supremacy Clause21 of the U.S.
Constitution barred the litigation.22 While Congress has waived TVA's
sovereign immunity to some degree by providing that TVA may "sue and
be sued in its corporate name,"23 TVA and North Carolina disagreed over
the scope of this waiver. 24 Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause provides
that the activities of the federal government be free from regulation by any
state. Although Congress waived some of this protection in the Clean
Air Act, TVA argued that this suit did not fall within that waiver because
of its basis in a state-law nuisance action.2 6 In an interlocutory appeal of a
TVA operates seven plants in Tennessee, two in Kentucky, and
two in Alabama. North
Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (W.D.N.C.
2009), overruledby Cooper II, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
'7 Id. at 815.
8
Id.at 825.
'9 1d. at 815.
20 The discretionary function doctrine prevents a tort suit against
the United States, its
agencies, or its officers where "the challenged conduct involves an element ofjudgment
or choice," and "that judgment is the kind that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield, i.e., . . . the challenged action is based on considerations of public
policy." Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988)).
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
22 North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley
Auth. (Cooperl), 515 F.3d 344, 347
(4th Cir. 2008).
23 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (2006).
24 Cooper 1, 515 F.3d at 347.
25 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943).
26 Cooper 1, 515 F.3d
at 351.
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denial of this motion, the Fourth Circuit found that none of the arguments
brought by TVA could prevent the suit from proceeding.2 7 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and the case
was remanded to the District Court for a trial on the merits.28
In a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Judge Lacy Thornburg agreed with North
Carolina and issued an injunction that required the immediate installation
of emissions controls at four plants located in Tennessee and Alabama.29
TVA appealed and the state of Alabama was granted leave to intervene.3 o
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found the district
court's ruling to be "flawed for several reasons." 3 ' First, the district court
applied the incorrect public nuisance law, using North Carolina's law
instead of the laws of Tennessee and Alabama. 32 Second, if the correct
law had been applied, the alleged injury would not have constituted a
public nuisance. Finally, public nuisance law did not provide proper
standards for determining emissions violations when there was a
"carefully created system for accommodating the need for energy

27 The court found that this suit did not implicate any "separation-of-powers concern" so
the "broad waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the TVA's 'sue-and-be-sued' clause
is not restricted by a discretionary function exception." Id. at 350. Regarding the
Supremacy Clause argument, the court determined the broad application of the term
"requirement" in the Clean Air Act does not exclude common-law nuisance actions, and
thus the waiver of the Supremacy Clause found in the Clean Air Act applies to TVA in
this public nuisance suit. Id. at 352-53.
28
1Id. at 353.
29 North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (Cooper II), 615 F.3d 291, 298
(4th Cir. 2010). The court found the other seven plants too far away from North Carolina
to have any impact and only those plants within a 100-mile radius contributed
significantly to North Carolina ozone levels. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825 (W.D.N.C 2009), overruled by Cooper II, 615
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
30 Cooper II, 615 F.3d at 298.
3'
Id. at 296.
32
33

id
id
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production and the need for clean air." 34 The appellate court subsequently
reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action. 35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Regulation through the Clean Air
Act
Congress enacted the federal Clean Air Act36 in order to "protect
and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources," and to provide
oversight and assistance to state and local governments in regulating and
managing emissions. The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the power to
develop acceptable levels of airborne emissions, known as National
Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). 3 8 These standards are
created to set a uniform level of air quality across the country, furthering a
healthy population and environment. 39 Not only are there primary
standards to protect individuals, but the Clean Air Act also creates
secondary standards designed to protect the surrounding environment.4 0
As a result of this statute, the EPA has promulgated air quality
standards for a number of emissions, including SO 2 and NOx. 4 1 These
standards are not arbitrarily set, but instead become adopted after
significant scientific research and a "reasonable time for interested persons
to submit written comments" has passed.4 2
It is important to understand that while the EPA establishes these
nationwide standards for emissions levels, "[it] does not directly regulate
actual sources of emissions."4 3 Congress understood that control and
34
3

id.

1Id. at 312.
3642 U.S.C. §§ 74 01-7671q
(2006).
3Id.
§ 7401(b)(1).
31 Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A), (b)(1).
Cooper 11, 615 F.3d at 299; see also Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit,
874
F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1989) ("The Act directs the EPA to prescribe national air quality
standards at a level sufficient to protect the public health and welfare.").
40 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)-(2) (2006).
41 These are the same emissions at issue
in this case. CooperII, 615 F.3d at 296.
42 Id. at 299 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)-(2)).
43

Id. at 299.
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prevention of air pollution at its source should lie with states and local
governments."' The EPA sets the air quality standards and the individual
states determine how to meet those requirements using individualized
plans. 45 "Each state is required to submit to the EPA a State
Implementation Plan ("SIP") 'which provides for implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of [air quality standards] ... within such
State."A 6 These plans must be consistent with EPA regulations and must
include enforceable emission limitations. Each state's plan must also
consider the impact of its own emissions on other states' abilities to meet
the required air quality standards.4 7 Practically, this ensures that a state
cannot export its emissions to another state without consequence. Thus, a
cohesive regulatory infrastructure exists while still allowing state
sovereignty to control.
If a state believes it is being subjected to unlawful interstate
emissions, it may file a "Section 126 petition." 8 This petition provides an
avenue for a neighboring state subject to "downwind" emissions to
address any concerns they may have "regarding the adequacy of an
upwind state's regulation of airborne emissions."' 9 In this way, there is a
method for a state to address concerns that current EPA regulations are not
preventing enough pollution to satisfy that state's standards.
B. Public Nuisance EnvironmentalClaims
Over the past twenty years, plaintiffs dissatisfied with government
regulation of clean water and air have sought to bring their claims using
U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2006).
CooperH, 615 F.3d at 299.
46 Id.(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1)).
47 Each state much ensure that its State Implementation Plan "contain adequate provisions
prohibiting . . . any source. . . within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts
which will contribute significantly to non-attainment in, or interfere with maintenance by,
4442

45

any other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D), (D)(i), (D)(i)(I) (2006).
48 CooperII, 615 F.3d at 300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2006)). "Any State or political
subdivision may petition the Administrator for a finding that any major source or group

of stationary sources emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition
of section 7410(a)(2)(D)." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)).
49

Cooper 11, 615 F.3d at 300-01.
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common law public nuisance doctrines.5 0 While some commentators
thought this trend had died by the early 1980s, 5 ' recent litigation has
created a renewed fervor for asserting challenges to environmental
regulation through tort law.
In Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,52 the U.S. Supreme Court
found that statutory law 53 had "eradicated any federal common law
remedies" re arding pollution of Lake Michigan from a nearby
municipality. 5 The main issue in Milwaukee was whether there existed a
federal replatory scheme that "spoke directly to the question" at issue in
the case.s Due to the statutory enactments regarding regulations of water
pollution, the statute essentially displaced the federal common law.56 The
Court noted that, "[t]he invocation of federal common law by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals in the face of congressional legislation
supplanting it is peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water
pollution control."5 7
This ruling was further extended in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.ss Here, the Supreme
Court found the "federal common law of nuisance ... fully pre-empted in
the area of ocean pollution."S9 Using the Milwaukee "preemption test,"60
the court first determined whether the claim asserted was within a
regulatory scheme already established by Congress; and second, whether
50

John Gray & Richard Faulk, Commentary, CircuitCourts Help Define
The Boundaries
OfPublic Nuisance, 31 No.4 WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 1 (2006).
5 WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., RODGERS' ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2:14 (2d ed. 2010) ("In

1981, the Supreme Court delivered two setbacks to those who perceived the federal
common law of nuisance as the means for repairing inadequate federal environmental
statutes.").
52 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Illinois brought suit against the city of Milwaukee because some
of Milwaukee's sewage plants discharged sewage into Lake Michigan (and therefore its
tributaries), endangering the health and safety of Illinois citizens. Illinois contended that
this action constituted a public nuisance under federal common law. Id.
s3 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2006).
54 RODGERS, supra note 51,

§ 2:14.

5Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315.
6
Id. at 317-319.
5Id.at 325.
58453 U.S. 1 (1981).
5 Id at 11.
60 RODGERS, supra note
51.
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said regulatory scheme has at least attempted to address the substance of
the claim. 6 1 Thus, a rubric for evaluating public nuisance claims began to
take hold.
Yet another early public nuisance case was International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette,6 2 which arose out of a suit by property owners on the
Vermont side of Lake Champlain against pulp mill operators whose mill
was on the New York side of the lake.6 3 Here, the Supreme Court first
determined that the proper law applicable in interstate nuisance disputes
would be the law of the "source" state. 64 Thus, the Clean Water Act
preempted Vermont nuisance law to the extent the law sought to impose
liability on a New York "point source." 65 Yet an important side note from
this case was that the Court specifically found that the Clean Water Act
did not bar an individual from asserting a nuisance claim pursuant to the
state law of the source state.6 6
Moving from water pollution to air pollution, the EPA was forced
to regulate carbon dioxide and other "green house gases" after the state of
Massachusetts successfully sued the EPA for underperforming in its
regulatory capacity to protect the health and safety of Americans.67 For
the purposes of this article, the importance of this case is that the Supreme
Court granted Massachusetts standing to bring the suit 8 and subsequently

61 See

Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1981).
2 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
63
1Id. at 483-84.
6 See id. at 497. "Source state" refers to whichever state contains the "source" of the
within its boundaries. Id. at 485.
problem
6
Id. at 494-95.
6 Id. at 497; see also Cooper Hl, 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010) ("The Ouellette Court
itself explicitly refrained from categorically preempting every nuisance action brought
under source state law.").
67 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007).
6
1d.at 520-21. "[I]t is clear that petitioners' submissions as they pertain to
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial process.
EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to
Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent.' There is, moreover, a 'substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested' will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that
risk." Id. at 521.
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allowed for the current litigation landscape.6 9 The main issue in many of
the following cases revolves around the correct application of this new
precedent regarding standing.
Subsequently, the first "common-law climate change" lawsuit
appeared in the form of Connecticut v. American Electric Power.70 Eight
states and three land trusts sued five major utility companies (who were
also the largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the U.S.), claiming the
companies were a public nuisance as they contributed to the increase in
global warming. 1 While the district court initially dismissed this case for
lack of standing because "resolution of the plaintiff's claims would require
the court to engage in the balancing of economic, environmental, and
national security interest, and. . . present[ed] a nonjusticiable political
question,"7 2 the Second Circuit disagreed.7 3 Relying on Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to seek
compensation for damages from climate change.7 4
Another climate-change case, California v. General Motors,75
proposed a now-familiar question of whether the state of California had
standing to seek damages from major automakers under a theory of
common-law public nuisance. 76 Essentially, California argued that the
automakers' products contributed to greenhouse gas emissions and thus
were a cause of global warming.n Referring to the Massachusetts
decision, the Northern District of California found that if it chose to
6 For a more in-depth analysis of this case and its far-reaching implications,
see Brett
Maland, A New Era of Green Regulation: EPA Must Regulate Climate Altering Gases
Emitted From Motor Vehicles, 15 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 369 (2008).
70 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). The suit was filed
in 2004, decided by the district court
in 2006, decided by the Second Circuit in 2009, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in December 2010 to settle these claims. So while it was the first filed, it is arguably the
most important case with regards to public nuisance and federal preemption issues. Id. at
314-15.
n1 Id. at 314.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N,Y. 2005).
7 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
74
Id. at 336-38 (finding also that the plaintiff had standing under the
factors provided by
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
76
Id. at 2.
n Id. at 1-2.
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proceed to the merits of the case, it would risk infringing upon federal
policymaking due to the EPA's forthcoming regulation of carbon dioxide
78
and other greenhouse gases. Thus, the court dismissed the case because
it presented a nonjusticiable political question. 79
The Northern District of California had yet another chance to hear
a climate change case in Native Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil.80 The
plaintiffs represented an Inupiat Eskimo village on the Alaskan coast and
alleged that twenty-four oil, energy and utility companies were responsible
for the erosion and destruction of the Artic ice shield protecting their
village.8 ' Specifically, Kivalina charged the defendants with contributing
to greenhouse gases and thereby causing global warming. 82 The district
court again found that ruling on the merits of this claim would require an
initial policy decision, and therefore presented a nonjusticiable political
question.8 3 Kivalina has filed an appeal currently pending in the Ninth
Circuit. 84
The case of Corner v. Murphy Oil USA 5 created a roadblock in the
Fifth Circuit for "climate change cases." This case concerned private
landowners-with damage from Hurricane Katrina-bringing a class
action suit including private and public nuisance claims against energy,
utility and mining companies. 8 6 They sought damages based on the
assertion that climate change aggravated Hurricane Katrina, which
damaged their land. While the district court initially dismissed the case
" See id. at 10-12 ("The underpinnings of the Supreme Court's rationale in
Massachusetts only reinforce this Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs current tort claim
would require this Court to make the precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations
that should be made by the political branches."). Id. at 12.
79 Id. at 16. After this decision, the state of California filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
but it voluntarily dismissed its appeal after General Motors filed for bankruptcy. Kevin
A. Gaynor et al., Challenges PlaintifsFace in LitigatingFederalCommon-Law Climate
Change Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYsIs 10845, 10848 (Sept. 2010).
80 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
8
Id. at
82

id.

868.

3
1 Id. at

876, 883.
Gaynor et al., supra note 79, at 10849.
8s 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
86
Id. at 859.
84

87

id.
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as a non-justiciable political question, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding
the plaintiffs had standing to bring public and private nuisance, trespass
and negligence claims.8 8 Subsequently, in a strange twist, a petition for
rehearing en banc was granted, and on May 28, 2010, the Fifth Circuit was
forced to dismiss the entire appeal due to a lack of quorum, allowing the
district court's dismissal of the case to be reinstated. 89
Though the initial hurdle of standing to bring a federal public
nuisance claim remains unclear, 90 a remaining issue is whether the
regulations promulgated through the EPA preempt common law tort
claims. Viewing the court's decision in North Carolinav. TVA, 9 1 it seems
unlikely that these claims can survive such a facial challenge.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

Judge Wilkinson, for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, found
the underlying district court's opinion flawed for multiple reasons.92 At
issue was whether public nuisance is an appropriate way to address this
claim, whether the correct state law was applied and whether TVA's
actions constituted a public nuisance when they were within federal and
state regulations. 9 3
Believing the real question at issue in the case to be "whether
individual states will be allowed to supplant the co-operative federal-state
Id. at 860.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g granted,598
F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 2010), appealdismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). At the time of the en
banc review, eight judges out of sixteen had to recuse themselves from the case. Under
the Fifth Circuit's own rules, this lack of quorum prevented it from conducting judicial
business. Furthermore, under its own precedent, the earlier appellate panel decision had
been vacated by the grant of a rehearing en banc, so the remaining precedent left standing
was the district court's decision to dismiss the case as a non-justiciable political question.
However, the plaintiffs still retain the right to petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Gaynor et al., supra note 79, at 10850.
90 Currently the Second Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to grant standing to the
plaintiffs in a "climate change case." See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.2d 309
(2d Cir. 2009).
91 CooperII, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
92
Id. at 296.
93
id.
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framework" created and refined by Congress, the court first discussed the
extensive history of the EPA's regulations regarding emissions and how
they interact with state regulations. 94 Specifically, it focused on the
requirements preventing a state from "exporting" their emissions to other
regions. 95 The court said that due to the many checks in the system, a
state dissatisfied with the adequacy of another state's regulation of its own
emissions has a method built into the statute to address this grievance. 96
The court provided this explanation to show that the Clean Air Act is a
highly comprehensive piece of legislation.97 While the Fourth Circuit
found it understandable that not everybody would agree with the process
put forth by the EPA, "[1]itigation that amounts to 'nothing more than a
collateral attack' on the system . . . risks results that lack both clarity and
legitimacy." 98 In pursuing a public nuisance cause of action, the court
determined that North Carolina sought to impose a different set of
standards. 99 The court gave many policy reasons against using public
nuisance law to regulate emissions, yet it stopped short of holding that
"Congress has entirely preempted the field of emissions regulation."100
In addition to the problem of "multiplicitous decrees" and
uncertain standards, the court found a bigger problem in allowing this
judgment to stand: North Carolina's approach questions the status quo
between the judiciary branch and federal agencies.' 0 ' The court argued
that Congress had entrusted emission regulation not to the courts, but to a
federal agency that can allocate the right resources.102 Further, it found
that Congress could have designated the judiciary with the primary
authority to set emissions standards, but instead it chose to utilize the
EPA. 0 3 "While expressing the utmost respect for the obvious efforts the
Id. at 298.
9s Id. at 300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D), (D)(i), (D)(1) (2006)).
96Id. at 300-01.
97
Id. at 301.
98
Id. at 301 (quoting Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir.
1993)).
9 Cooper II. 615 F.3d at 301.
"o Id. at 302.
94

1o Id.
102 id.
1o3

at 304.

id.
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district court expended in this case, we doubt seriously that Congress
thought that a judge holding a twelve-day bench trial could evaluate more
than a mere fraction of the information that regulatory bodies can
consider."l04 The Fourth Circuit felt that courts should respect the
authority of the agency process, by which predictable standards grounded
in science, and thus easily relied on, have been provided.'os Because the
breadth of public nuisance law has very little standards, the court
determined public nuisance does not avail itself to predictability 1 0
Looking to the Supreme Court's decision in Ouellette, 107 the
Fourth Circuit determined without question that in an interstate nuisance
dispute, the law of the states where the emissions source is located should
apply. 1os While the district court acknowledged and claimed to be
following this standard, it essentially applied the North Carolina's Clean
Smokestacks Act' 09 extraterritorially in Alabama and Tennessee.' 0 From
the expert witness testimony at trial to the language of the Clean
Smokestacks Act, the Fourth Circuit determined that all the evidence
proved that North Carolina desired to apply its standards to the TVA
plants, even though they were not located within the state of North
Carolina."' The court concluded that, in issuing its injunction, the district
court practically followed line by line the emissions caps suggested by
North Carolina's key expert witness.11 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
these suggestions followed the Clean Smokestacks Act requirements
almost exactly." 3 Thus, in following the advice of the expert witness, the
district court applied requirements found in the North Carolina statute
extraterritorially to Tennessee and Alabama.11 4 "The Supreme Court
emphasized that only source state law, here that of Alabama and
104 Id. at 305.
Id. at 305-06.
0os
6

See id. at 306.
107 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 429 U.S.
481, 487 (1987).

0oCooper 11, 615 F.3d at 306 (citing Ouellette, 429 U.S. at 497).
09
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107D (2010).
10 Cooper II, 615 F.3d at 306-07.
'Id. at 307-08.

Id. at 308-09.
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Id. at 307.

Id. at 308.
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Tennessee, could impose more stringent emission rates than those required
by federal law on plants located in those two jurisdictions.""' 5
In its final reason for overturning the district court's ruling, the
Fourth Circuit found that even if the district court had properly applied
Alabama and Tennessee's own public nuisance law to the issue at hand, it
would be quite hard to uphold the injunctions because TVA's plants were
"expressly permitted by the states where they are located."1 16 Citing to
previous precedent and treatises on torts, the court found that,
traditionally, courts have been reluctant to deem an activit "specifically
authorized by the government" as a public nuisance. I' Since both
Alabama and Tennessee state laws subscribe to this principle, the court
found that "TVA's plants cannot logically be public nuisances ... where
TVA is in compliance with [the federal and state regulations]."" 8
Near the end of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that its
decision was not leaving North Carolina without a remedy."' 9 It detailed
the multiple processes provided by the EPA through which North Carolina
could bring its grievance.120 Ultimately, the court was unwilling to upend
an entire body of law when legislation provided a superior way to handle
this issue.12 1
The court stated that the trial court's ruling, if allowed to stand,
would have encouraged vague public nuisance standards by replacing a
"carefully created system" with a "confused patchwork of standards, to the
detriment of industry and the environment alike."122 The Fourth Circuit
found that even if public nuisance law had been appropriate to apply in
this case, the district court incorrectly applied North Carolina law rather
than Tennessee or Alabama law as required by Supreme Court
precedent.123 Finally, even if the district court had correctly applied
source state law, is the court found it "difficult to understand how an
115
Id. (citing
116

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 429 U.S. 481, 494-497 (1987)).
Id. at 309.
117
Id.(citing New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981)).
18 Id. at 310.
" Id. at 310-11.
120 id.

121

Id. at 312.
123 Id. at 296.
Id. (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 429 U.S. 481, 497 (1987)).
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activity expressl permitted and extensively regulated" could constitute a
public nuisance.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court and remanded with directions to dismiss this case.125
V. COMMENT
Many environmentalists have become impatient with the federal
government's lack of action regarding climate change. Due to the
perceived "inadequacy" of federal regulation, environmental advocates
have turned to the judicial branch. Currently, the EPA and the Clean Air
Act do not actively regulate "greenhouse gases," which has led to the
recent spike in "climate change litigation" utilizing the common law tort
of public nuisance. 126 With the latest political shift in Washington,127 it
seems unlikely that the government will manage to effectively bring about
the regulation and change many environmentalists seek.128 As a result,
this trend in environmental litigation seems unlikely to disappear on its
own.
124 id.

12

s Id. at 312.
126 The EPA has announced a proposed rule focusing on regulation of large facilities
that
emit "greenhouse gases." This rule was announced on September 30, 2009, but has yet to
be implemented. This rule is in keeping with the Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA, requiring the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. See
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by
the Federal PSD Permit Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,535 (Oct. 7, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52).
127 Starting in 2008, the Democratic Party enjoyed control of both houses of Congress and
the Presidency. However, after the congressional election of 2010, Republicans regained
a majority in the House of Representatives and closed the gap in the Senate. See also
Letter from 18 Republican Governors to President Obama (Mar. 18, 2011), available at:
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Letters/11 2th/032 11 10bama.pd
f (referring to the EPA's policy as an "unreasonably aggressive regulatory agenda").
128 While EPA's new regulations aimed at greenhouse gases were scheduled to roll out on
January 2, 2011, there is a coalition of House Representatives, including emboldened
Republicans, seeking to delay these EPA rules for two years. Additionally, the EPA is
facing lawsuits from states concerning the agency's power to limit greenhouse gas
emissions. Texas is leading this charge, as it has so far refused to issue permits or allow
the EPA to issue permits for greenhouse gas emissions. Posting of Darren Goode to E2
Wire, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/128601 (Nov. 10, 2010, 11:58 EST).
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A. Predictingthe Future: PotentialEffects of U.S. Supreme Court Review
ofAmerican Electric Power v. Connecticut
Initially, the biggest hurdle involves overcoming the "standing"
requirement, as many of these cases are dismissed at the circuit level for
being nonjusticiable political questions. At the moment, all eyes look
toward the U.S. Supreme Court, as it has recently granted certiorari to
review American Electric Power v. Connecticut.129 This is the only
current case where a federal court of appeals has given the plaintiffs
standing to pursue a claim of public nuisance due to global warming.130
At least twelve states have signed an amicus brief urging the Court to
overturn the Second Circuit due to its "impermissible intrusion into the
political realms to let federal judges set source-by-source limits on
greenhouse gases." 13 1 While no one seems to think American Electric
Power will be won on the merits, many are concerned over the precedent
set in allowing standing for this type of claim.' 32 Even the Obama
administration, which has vowed to address climate change, filed a brief
advocating reversal of the Second Circuit. 133 Claiming the EPA's new
greenhouse gas regulations have "displaced common law," the brief was
seen as a betrayal by some environmental activists.1 34
In choosing to hear this case, the Supreme Court could decide once
and for all whether "[s]tates and private plaintiffs have standing to seek,
and whether federal common law provides authority for courts to impose,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10174).
30
oSee supra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
131 Gabriel Nelson, CLIMATE: 12 states ask Supreme Courtto Review 'Nuisance' Case,
GREENWIRE, Sept. 8, 2010; see also Brief of the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. Sept. 3,
2010) (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3501263.
132 "The justiciability of climate change lawsuits under federal common law is an issue of
extraordinary national importance. To permit federal adjudication of claims seeking
damages for past emissions and injunctions curtailing future emissions would heighten
the risks and uncertainties for businesses and countless other entities, including state
agencies, which may suddenly find themselves as defendants in a federal suit." Brief of
the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 131, at 1.
129

133 Nelson, supra note 131.
I34 id.
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a non-statutory, judicially-created regime for setting caps on greenhouse
gas emissions based on 'vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts." 3 5
If the Supreme Court upholds the federal appellate court and decide to
grant standing, the door may be flung open for plaintiffs to bring common
law nuisance suits to circumvent the regulatory infrastructure that have
failed to bring desired results. Alternatively, if the Court finds that this is
in fact a nonjusticiable political question, environmentalists will have to
return to their lobbying efforts to get actual climate change legislation
passed through Congress.
B. Impact of North Carolinav. TVA (CooperII)
While North Carolinav. TVA is not technically a "climate change"
case, it does involve an attempt to regulate emissions through the public
nuisance doctrine. 136 Where similar cases have faltered, this case
represents a unique outcome-the court actually proceeded past the
standing hurdle and ruled on the merits of the argument.137 In analyzing
how the Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion, clues to the outcome of
future "climate change" cases may be found.
The plaintiffs in North Carolinav. TVA lost on the merits because
the court found that TVA could not possibly constitute a public nuisance
when they were within the emissions requirements promulgated by the
EPA in the Clean Air Act.1 38 Because there exists a statutory regime
directly on point regarding these emissions, the court found the vagueness
of public nuisance inadequate to redress any perceived injury.139
For the time being, greenhouse gases remain unregulated by the
Clean Air Act.140 Furthermore, the U.S. has not enacted any federal
legislation regarding these emissions.141 If a "climate change case" were
to proceed beyond the standing requirement, a court may well find a
for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut,
582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. Aug. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3054374.
36 Cooper II, 615 F.3d 291,
297 (4th Cir. 2010).
37
Id. at 301-306.
38
I at 310.
Id.
139
1d. at 311.
140
14 See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
135Petition

1

d.
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defendant liable under a public nuisance theory for its pollution and
emission of greenhouse gases. With no federal law on point to preempt or
give guidance, an active judiciary may choose to hold an entire industry or
business liable and subject it to public nuisance liability.
C. Fourth Circuit'sRoadmapfor Climate Change Public Nuisance
Analysis
The Fourth Circuit went through three main steps in evaluating this
public nuisance claim. These requirements could very well become the
benchmark for future environmental public nuisance claims since this case
is one of the few to proceed to the merits. First, a court should determine
if regulations exist (either federal or state) relating to the greenhouse gas
emissions (or other environmental issue) at hand. Second, if there are
regulations on point, a court must determine whether the defendant has
properly adhered to these standards. If the defendant is found not to be in
compliance with the statute, they are probably liable, at a minimum, for
violating the statute and possibly for a public nuisance claim as well.
However, if there are regulations on point and the defendant is acting
within those regulations, it will be very hard for the plaintiff to succeed in
showing the alleged actions constitute a public nuisance. Third, in
deciding whether nuisance law is appropriate, a court should determine
whether the legislation provides an avenue to redress the alleged "wrong."
If the issue has gone unregulated (as with greenhouse gas emissions), the
court may find itself engaged in the balancing act of tort analysis where it
must weigh the burden of precaution versus the probability and gravity of
harm.
If one of these "climate change cases" manages to proceed to the
merits, it will not be a clear win for environmentalists yet. The issues of
causation and compensation loom large, especially when trying to deduce
whether one particular defendant is truly responsible for all of the alleged
harm to the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's decision made it clear that a common law
public nuisance claim is not a desired way to regulate emissions on a
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national level. Many of the issues Judge Wilkinson discussed would be a
problem with a climate change case as well. Federal common law entails
a wide range of interpretation, and without a standard set of rules
governing the country, many members of the business and industry
community would be hard-pressed to comply. While the threat of
litigation may force big companies to rethink their energy policies, public
nuisance claims would provide minimal guidance for a company looking
to prevent a suit. This tangled web of common law regulations could end
up doing more harm than good. Forcing change through judicial activism
may help kick-start the government into action, but it would probably hurt
the businesses and the economy in the long run. While it is clear that the
Fourth Circuit desired to close the door on this notion of emissions
regulation through public nuisance law, they have left ajar a window into
this realm of litigation. Because the court stopped short of holding the
entire field of emissions regulation preempted by federal law, there may
yet exist a claim for a tenacious lawyer to bring, possibly allowing a future
court to answer environmentalists' hopes.
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